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ABSTRACT 
This report is intended to set forth some of the problems and 
solutions involved in financing and regulating water quality control. 
The purpose is to record some of the major problems confronting those 
who legislate water quality, those who espouse technological answers, 
and those who see the problem in terms of economic solutiona. The 
limits placed by political and institutional constraints on solutions 
to these problems are fiequently not understandable. 
Within this report are contained separate investigations: a 
study of federal-interstate relations and the interstate compact; a 
study of Kentucky's common law approach to water rights; a study of 
financing water quality under Kentucky statutes; and a summary and 
analysis, Each of these areas touches on problems involved in the 
planning process; in this context, the following problems will be 
considered: (1) The availability of water. (2) Water and economic 
development. (3) Water and the environment. (4) Responsibilities 
for water resource development. (5) Legal framework for development. 
(6) Financing water resource development. (7) Political and institu-
tional constraints. 
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Legislation, Legal Aspects, Financing, Water Law, Water Policy, 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Kentucky is more than 120 counties, it is an entire 
state, shaped like a keyhole, that cuts across the mid-section 
of Southeastern United States. The major intrastate rivers flow, 
primarily, into the Ohio River; three percent, or the remainder, 
flow into the Mississippi River. 1 Water quality in Kentucky is an 
natural and man-made consequences, and any water-use will affect 
2 the quality of the water. For our purposes, it is necessary to 
point out that the soil conditions, themselves, as well as the 
quantity of water available, contribute to the pollution of the 
waters, because of the limestone formations which contribute to the 
alkalinity of the water.3 Hovevei; the basic source of pollution 
affecting water quality is man-made; municipal, rural, industrial, 
or agricultural pollution caused by man's activities.,. 
Municipal pollution is the accumulation of domestic wastes. 
To this category can be added industrial wastes - normally created 
in the washing, cooling, flushing, and chemical treatment processes 
employed by industry. 5 Industrial processes can be made more costly 
1 Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Division of 
Water. Kentucky Water Resources Program Summary, P• 5. 
2Ibid., P• 11. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Jbid., P• 12. 
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when doaeetic eevage deteriorate• the quality of the water need in 
1111U1nfacturina:1 domeetic water enppliea, fishlife, and plant life 
-y be harmed by the chemical and thermal pollution created by 
6 indnetrial vastes, In Kentucky, agricultural run-off and excessive 
uee of chemical fertilizers add to the over-all vater quality 
problem.7 Moreover, in certain parte of the state, mine drainage 
adde to the over-all water quality problem,
8 
It must be remembered that water resources control and 
- --development h-a combination of supply, qua-lity,--flood control~,--
navigation, power generation, and recreation.9 Water resources are 
a combination of precipitation, rivers and streams, and ground water 
enpply, and the hydrologic cycle doee not divide water into the neat 
legal categories based upon the claesification or 1tat•a of the 
10 ueer or of the water. In Kentucky, water resource development as 
a part of the planning procese has been divided into numerous depart-
aents so that little can be done unless coordination and control is 
1uperimposed on the extra framework. The Kentucky Framework Water Plan 
lists seven major agencies as dealing with water resource problems; 
the Water Resources Authority of Kentucky, which maintains a planning 
function; the Department of Natural Resources; the Kentucky Water 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., P• 23, 
10 Morse, "The 
Water Quality Control 
(1973), 
Cost of Purity1 Use of the Effluent Charge in 
and Management," 7 Valparaiso U, Law Rev. 170 
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Pollution Control Comaisaion; the Department of Mines and Minerals! 
the Public Service Comaiasion; the Department of Agriculture; and 
the Kentucky Port and River Development Comnission. 11 To this list 
can be added the Department for Natural Resources and Enviro-ntal 
Protection and the Kentucky Pollution Abatement Authority. 12 The 
over-all structure of Kentucky water resources developnent bas become 
a multilayered bureaucracy that vitally undercuts any attempt to 
seriously consider rationalizing the creation of a centralized water 
. --resources develoPJll.en!_@d control program. 
State development in the water resources area has been directed 
toward replacing multilayered bureaucracy and outdated legislation 
with an entire code that deals with water resource• develoiment and 
control in one package.13 One example of such a code is the Model 
Water Code authored by Maloney. Ausnesa. and Morris• and recently 
adopted by the State of Florida.14 The Code• itself, is baaed upon 
a n11111ber of existent state plans and covers every area of water 
11 Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Division 
of Water. Kentucky Water Resourcee Program. p. 36-40. 
12 Governor Wandel Ford reorganized the environmental resources 
programs in 1973. creating a Department for Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection. (The Courier-Journal• Thursday• January•• 
1973), Confirmed by Senate Bill 112, Section 15. 197• Kentucky General 
As~embly, effective June 21. 1974. 
13see, Morse, "A Model Water Code," Book Review. 62 Kentucky 
Lav J. 289 (1973-74); Maloney and Ausness. "Administering State Water 
Resources: The Need for Long-Range Planning•" 73 W. Va. Lav Rev. 209 
(1971). 
1~loney. Auaness, and Morris. A Model Water Code. Gaines-
ville• Fla.; U. of Florida Press• 1972. 
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re•ource• as ¥1111 as creating a two-tiered admini•trative etructure 
compr6•ed of a State Water Resource• Board and regional water manage-
.. nt districts, 15 Chapter one deals with the administrative structure; 
chapter two createa a pennit system for regulating consU111ptive uses of 
water; chapter three provides for well construction standards and 
licenaing; chapter four regulates dam construction, impoundaenta, and 
appurtenant worka; chapter five covera water quality, including a 
- - - --water -quality-plan,-construetion and cliacharge-permi-ts,-and-enfol'Oement--
tools; and the final chapter is on, weather modification,16 The phil-
osophy of the Model Code is expreased in the declaration of policy 
vhich ia to plan and develop adequate water resources for the State. 17 
Our interest in this report is with Chapter 5, Water Quality; 
however, there is no denying the fact that dealing with the problem of 
water pollution control in a pie1mmeal effort without attacking the 
entire problem of water resource developnent and control is a waste-
ful and, perhaps, futile venture, Kentucky needs not only a permit 
system and a means for regional integration of pollution control 
facilities, it also needs a comprehensive structure of legal authority 
for development and enforcement, The imposition of two or three more 
laws onto an already overburdened bureaucracy will only serve as a 
i5Cbapter 1, Administrative Structure and Operation; See, 
Morse, "Model Water Code," supra,, at p, 292, 
16Tbe incluaion of weather modification and the ollission of 
agricultural spraying is to be questioned; however weather modification 
is a little regulated activity while agricultural spraying receives both 
state and federal attention, §!!!., Morse, "Model Water Code," supra., 
at 295, 
17 Sec, 102, Declaration of Policy. 
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temporary solution to a problem that demands an overhaul, not a 
repair job. 
Water Quality Control Under a Permit System 
The Federal Yater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 set 
forth tvo provisions applicable to the states that are releT&Dt to 
this discussion. Title II--Grants for -the Construction of Treat-
ment Works18 and Title IV--Permita and Licenaes.19 Title II, 
Section 201 (e) states, "The Administrator shall encourage waate 
treatment management which results in integrating facilities for 
sewage treatment and recycling with facilities to treat, dispose of, 
or utilize other industrial and municipal wastes, including but not 
limited to solid waste and waste heat and thennal discharges. Such 
integrated facilities shall be designed and operated to produce 
revenues in excess of capital and operation and maintenance costs 
and such revenues shall be used by the desinated regional unagement 
agency to aid in financing other environmental improvement programs." 
Section 201 (g) allows payment to, "any state, mnnicipality, or 
intermunicipal or interstate agency ••• " Section 204: Limitations 
and Conditions, Subsection {b) states, "(1) Notwithstanding any 
other provisions of this title, the Administrator shall not approve 
any grant for any treatment vorks under section 201 (g)(1) after 
1BP. L. 92-500. (October 18, 1972). 
19P. L. 92-500. (October 18, 1972). 
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Karch 1, 197J, unleH he ehall fir11t have determined that the applicant 
(a) has adopted or will adopt a system of charges to assure that each 
recipient of waste treatment eervices within the applicant's juris-
diction, as detenained by the Adminietrator, will pay its proportionate 
share of the costs of operation and maintenance (including replacement) 
of any waste treatment services provided by the applicant; (b) has made 
provision for the payment to such applicant by the industrial users of 
---- --the--treatment -works -of-that -portion of the cost-of-construction-of~-~ --
such treatment works (asdeti:nained by the Administrator) which is 
allocable to the treatment of such industrial wastes to the extent 
attributable to the Federal share of the cost of construction; and 
(c) has legal, institutional, managerial, and financial capability 
to insure adequate construction, operation, and maintenance of 
treatment works throughout the applicant's jusidiction, aa determined 
by the administrator. (2) The administrator shall, within one 
hundred and eighty days after the date of enactment of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972, and after consulta-
tion with appropriate state, interstate, municipal, and intermunici-
pal agencies, issue guidelines applicable to payment of waste treat-
ment costs by industrial and nonindustrial recipients of waste treat-
ment services which shall establish (a) classes of users of such 
services, including categories of industrial users: (b) criteria 
against which to determine the adequacy of charges imposed on classes 
and categories of users reflecting all factors that influence the 
cost of waste treatment, including strength, volume, and delivery 
flow rate, characteristics of waste; and (c) model systems and rates 
of user charges typical of various treatment works serving municipal 
-6-
industrial co11m11Diti&B, (3) The grantee shall retain an amount of 
the revenues derived from the payment of coats by industrial users of 
wa•te treat.ment services, to the extent coats are attributable to the 
Federal share of the eligible project coats provided pursuant to this 
title as determined by the Administrator equal to (a) the amount of 
the non-Federal cost of such project paid by the grantee plus (b) the 
amount, determined in accordance with regulations proaalgated by the 
- - ---Adminiatrator,-neceasary for future expansion_and__recons:truc:tion_of ___ _ 
the project, except that such retained amount shall not exceed 50 
percentum of such revenues from such project. All revenues from such 
project not retained by the grantee shall be deposited by the Admin-
istrator in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. That portion of 
the revenues retained by the grantee attributable to clause (b) of 
the first sentence of this paragraph, together vi th any interest 
thereon shall be used solely for the purposes of future expansion and 
reconstruction of the project. (4) Approval by the administrator of 
a grant to an interstate agency established by interstate compact for 
any treatment works shall satisfy any other requirements that such 
works be authorized by Act of Congress." 
It is apparent that under the F, W. P. C, A. charges are 
required and that those charges are to be based upon the services 
received by the users, This requirement will be discussed at length 
with references to Kentucky; however it is necessary first to point 
out the relationship of this provision to Title IV. Permits and 
Licenses. Section 402 of the 1972 amendments governs the national 
permit program which provides for state permit programs complying with 
-7-
the requireaenta of Title IV; diacharge of any pollutant without 
a perai t h illegal, and the permi ta cannot be given unle811 the 
propoaed permit holder agree• to comply with effluent limitations 
regarding point dhchargea, nev sources, toxic substances, and 
pretreatment. 20 
The permit system replaces the Refuse Act of 189921 program; 
althouah enforcement authority under that Act for certain diachargea 
_ilaJ1_he,_11_mai11tDi11ed by the federal govel"Dm!lnt._~ __ }tha_t_ia_impol':ton_t ___ _ 
to underatand is the scopt! of the definition of navigable waters 
to which the permit program applies. Senate Report No. 92-1236 
accompanying P.L. 92-500 stated that navigable waters should be given 
the broadest constitutional interpretation possible and cited Court 
history aa moving from navigation in fact to a theory based on inter-
atate commerce. 23 Subsequently the Environmental Protection Agency 
Remedies. 
Co., 1973. 
2°irannacone, Cohen, Davison. 
1973 Supp. Vol. 1 Rochester, 
21 33 u. s. c. 407. 
Envirolllllllltal Rights and 
N.Y.: Lavyers• Co-op Pub. 
223 Environmental Law Reporter. Current Developaenta 1230 
(Feb, 9, 1973) 40 C.F.R, Sec. 125,42 (a} 38 Fed. Reg. 13540 (May 22, 
1973), states that discharges made without a pt!rmit issued under 
Sec. 402 of the FWPCA 1972 or in violation of permit terms and cond-
itions may result in institution of proceedings under the Refuse Act. 
40 C.F.R, Sec. 125.42 (b) states that mere filing of an application 
for a Sec. 402 permit will not preclude legal action for violation 
of the Refuse Act, The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA states that no 
new litigation under the Refuse Act will be instituted until Dec. 31, 
1974, or until final administrative action baa been taken on permit 
applications under 1972 Act, whichever is sooner. The 1972 amendments 
do not affect pt!Dding litigation under the Refuse Act. U.S. v. Pennsy-
lvania Industrial Chea, Corp, ,_u.s._; 5 Environmental Reporter, 
1332, 1333 n, 2 (1973) Kentucky had not yet submitted a program acceptable 
to the federal government as of this Yriting. 
23s, Report 92-1236 accompanying P.L. 92-500, p. 144, 
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releaeed a "Memo to the Regional Office• on the Meaning of the Tena 
'MaTigable Waters,'" which steted that the tena referred to, •(1) 
all naTigable vaters of the United Stetes; (2) Tributeries of 
navigable vaters of the United Stete•1 (J) Interstete vaters; (4) 
Intrastete lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by inter-
atete travellers for recreational and other purpose•; (5) Intra-
etate lakes, rivers, and streams from where fish or ehellffeh are 
--- --- -taken and sold in interstete comerce; (6) Interetate __ lakes, __ rinrs, __ _ 
and streams which are utilized for industrial purposes by industries 
in interstate comerce.•24 In fact, the definition covers, "th• 
vaters of the United States including territerial seaa,• and cover• 
eny activities, including sewerage facilities which might affect 
vater quality. 25 
The Environmental Protection Agency bas issued guideline• 
stating the requirements for a state permit program under the national 
permit program. 26 Pursuant to these regulations, the Council of 
244 Environmental Law Reporter 46318; 40 C.F.R. 125.1 fp)1 
38 Fed. Reg. 13527, May 22 1 1973; as amended by J8 Fed. Reg. 17999, 
July 5, 1973, and J8 Fed. Reg. 19894, July 24, 1973. 
25s. Report 92-1236, p. 144. 
26sec. J04 (h) (2) of the FWPCA of 1972 sets forth the 
procedures; 40 C.F,R. Part 124; 37 Fed. Reg. 28390 (Dec. 22, 1972); 
j Environmental Law Reporter, Current Developments 1266 (Feb. 16, 
1973) amended j Environmental Law Re orter. Current Developments 
1447 (March JO, 1973 . See, "Memo of E.P.A. Deputy Acting Adlllinistr-
ators Regarding the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems 
Permit," 3 Environmental Law Re orter. Current Developments 339 
(June 29, 1973; letter of E.P.A. Administrator to State Governors 
on legislation needed to carry out National Pollutant Discharge Elim-
ination Systems, j Environmental Reporter. Current Developments. 
985 (Dec. 22, 1972). 
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State Govel'IIJlenta adopted a Model Law to Enable States to Participate 
in the National Discharge Elimination System. 27 ('llhich will be 
discussed below) 
The combination of the requireaenta in Title II for recovering 
uHr charge a and the imposition in Title IV of a permit ayatea upon 
di•charges into all waters of the United States necessitates that 
Kentucky implement a Program acceptabll to the E. P. A. to qualify 
- for-federal funding -for-construction of aeverage-faci-1-i-ties.--Th.__ ___ _ 
existing state legislation provides for implementation of the pro-
g1'11111a, and it is only the utilization of these statutory powers to 
construct a program that is necessary, inaofar as the user charges 
and financing ia concemed. As for a permit system, it would appear 
that the Model State Law proposed by the Council of State Governments 
h an acceptable vehicle for briqi .. the state into compliance Yi th 
federal legislation. 28 
It is, of course, the contention of the writers that a major over-
haul of Kentucky's natural resource legislation is the real solution 
and that serious thought should be given by the legislature to adopt-
ing a Model Water Code29 in lieu of patchwork attempts to restructure 
the present legislative structure. Such a solution would enable the 
state to coordinate its water planning ae to consumption, quality, and 
27"Model Law to Enable States to Participate in the National 
Pollution Elimination System Established Under the 1972 ~." 
(Council of State Governments, Feb. 1973) Environmental Law Reporter. 
State Water Laws 611.0101. 
28 Ky. Rev. Stat. 224. 06o. 
29see, Maloney, Ausness, and Morrie, supra. 
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•••• tor Tario•• coaflicti111 alternative• auch ae domaatic conaumption, 
in4uatry, recraation, na'l'igation, an4 agriculture. However, it h 
ob'l'io•• that total reform must ,1..,. -y to needed COIIJ>liance within the 
exiatins tramevvrk. The uaer char1e• 4iecuased below are applicable 
Yi thin Kentucky'• exhtina; lea;ialation. :,o The -del pel'lllit ayatem 
could be implemented through Section 221.010 of the Kentucky Re'l'iaed 
Statute•, as vae Regulation WP-1 on Kentucky Waste Discharge Pe:nrlt 
regulations ueued on January 8, 1957)1 
Integrating these efforts into regional or interstate programs 
could be accomplished through the exiating interstate compact,'2 and 
the regional organizations of an intraatate nature in Kentucky.· 
Horeo....r, Section 20li, quoted above specifically provides for approval 
by the administrator of grants to interstate agencies established by 
interstate compacts in Section 20li (b) (,).'' 
This report cannot, however, stress too greatly the need for a 
thorough revision of Kentucky's entire -ter resource planning an4 
reco!lllllend that (1) a thorough review be -de ot atatutes that pertain 
to -ter resources; (2) responsibility for water resource, be cent-
ralized and coordinated; (3) a state water plan be developed; (1) the 
legal status of users and the legal categories of -ter uaes be re-
defined; (5) a permit system for both the consumption and quality of 
30see, text,~· 
31Attached as appendix. (Regulation WP-1) 
32 See, footnote 131, infra. 
3\.L. 92-500. 
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water be introducedJ and (6) a codification of all lava pertaining to 
water resources be undertaken,3% 
It ia the limited purpose of this report to set forth a 11.ethod 
of utilising the Kentucky framework to implement certain progrsms 
necessary for compliance with federal legislation and to do so in an 
efficient manner that will best allocate available resources, Our 
contention is that the combination of user charges and the permit 
--sy-.tem-wi thin- a-regional organization iDVQlving-both-intrastate ______ _ 
and interstate facilities will be the moat economic and efficient 
method of undertaking compliance with the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. We will proceed to discuaa the economics of uaer charge 
ll)"Btem within the Kentucky framework and then will proceed with a 
diacuasion of a possible model law and regulations to imple11.ent the 
system, 
3"xentucky. Department of Natural Resources, Division of 
Water, Kentucky Framework Water Plan, p, 1-21. 
-12-
B. THE f.qUITY ARD ECONOMIES OF STATE 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FINANCING 
State Compliance With the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Ameudllents of 1972: The Value of the Effluent Charge in 
Kentucky. 
At beBt, in attelllJ)ting to eolTe the problem of water pollution 
politician• search for the right bureaucracy, bureaucrats persist in 
__ t.ll!i!" _se_emingly endleaa queet for the "right" set of rnlea and reg-
ulatione, ,mile engineers continue their ecientific bunt for that 
tventietb century .American miracle: the technological fis. A.a 
important as government interdiction, efficient administration, and 
applied technology -y all be in dealing with the problem of water 
pollution they are all bound by themselvea to have disappointing 
reeulte. 
Politics, law,and technology can constitute by themselves only 
the framewok and method by which nny given solution is to be imple-
mented. Although they are of course, the necessary flesh of any 
workable solution's bones, they are not the substantive bones of any 
solution. This basic fact, though, is too often overlooked and as a 
result the two primary and fundamental aspects of water pollution control 
are ignored in the process. The problem of water pollution control 
is in substance an economic problem35 involving social coats.J6 This 
J5See Hite, Macaulay, Stepp aud Yandle, Jr., The Economies of 
Environmental Quality (1972); See also Kneese and Bower, Managing Water 
Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (1968). 
: 
36ituff,"The Economic Common Sense of Pollution~ The Public Interest, 
Spring, 69 (1970). 
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etud:y therefore coneider1 the financing of water quality control and 
management 1yetema with regard to theae two key aspects of the 
pollution problem. 
The framework for analysis is the passage of enabling legislation l7 
by the Kentucky General Assembly in order that Kentucky might comply Yi th 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.'8 In the 
role of "devil I s advocate" this report takes a critical look at the 
~ newly cuated Kentucky Po~llution Abatement At1:t~or!-tY'':~~and the finan-
cing scheme40 it proposes to use in generating state revenue for 
procuring matching federal funds. Theee federal matching grants will 
be used for construction of sewerage treatment facilities by local 
water treatment districts in Kentucky in compliance with the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendment• of 1972~1 Since this Act is 
undoubtedly the most ambitious and encompassing legislation in the 
area of water purity to date, enabling state legislation in compliance 
with federal law deserves to be carefully scrutinized. Under federal 
37Kentucky Acts 1972 ch. 329. Kentucky Revised Statutes (here-
inafter referred to as K.R.S. ch. 224A. H.B. 560 effective June 21, 1974, 
amendud K.R.S. 224 to include county and urban county govermaents, to 
make the reference to the water pollution control agency to the Depart-
ment for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and to incor-
porate the necessity for compliance ~-ith the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972; no substantive changes were made, 
38 ( ) Pub. L. No. 92-500 Oct, 18, 1972. 
39 K.R.S. ch. 224A. 
40 K.R.s. ch. 224A §§ 6, 19, 20. 
' 1Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972). 
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law 1reat latitude in the aubatantiTe aapects of regulation 1111.d 
la2 fi111111ciag ha• been left to atate diacretion. It i• hoped that 
thi• broad diacuaaion of the equity 1111.d economies of water pollution 
control financina generally 1111.d the critique of the Kentucky caae 
1pecifically will shed some light on how this discretion may be used 
Yi•ely. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 require 
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the 
United Stat..s be eliminated by 1985 • .laJ Provision is -de in the Act 
for gr1111.ta to the states for construction of waste water treatmaat 
works," This provision states in part that: 
waste water treatment management plans 1111.d practices shall 
provide for the application of the beat practicable vaate 
treatment technology before 1111.y discharge into receinng 
waters, including reclaiming 1111.d recycling of water, and 
confined disposal of pollutants so they will not migrate 
to cause water or other environmental pollution and shall la 
provide for consideration of advanced treat.aent techniques. 5 
States under the Act are required to submit for federal approval water 
quality standards and implementation plans based on point discharge 
effluent limitations,46 Moreover, Title II of the Act requires that 
42Ibid,, § 101 (b). 
43Ibid., § 101 (a)(1), 
44Ibid., §§ 201-12, 
45Ibid., § 201 (b). 
46Ibid,, §§ 301-03. 
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' 
a system of charges be included in any project whereby users pay an 
appropriate share of the costs of operatien and .. inteDaDce ef the 
system before eny grant is approved, 47 These previsions aebe1rledge 
tile i!!tregal problems of -ter quality aad ,naae-nt, .\8 accept cest-
benefit criteria as a guideline for pollution goals'9 and require 
the internalization of costs by the imposition of charges en water 
users,50 The Act, however, though it esta\lishes llinimma federal 
---standards and -guidel-inea that states -must -•t,~1-leaves-pr:lmary~-- ___ _ 
responsibility for implementation and adllinietration ef water quality 
control systems to the individual state!!, The impact ef the Act 
depends then on continuing effective and f11Dctioaal state action, 
State Financing of Water Quality Control Syat ... 
A great variety of financing ache-• are employed throughout 
the United States in water quality control and IIIIUlal-nt systems, 
The user charge is by far the most prevalent method of water quality 
control financing to the extent that direct government appropriations 
46Ib"d 
1 • ' §§ ,01-03, 
47Ibid,, §§ 201-12, 
48senate Comm, on Public Works, Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972, S, Rep, No, 92-41,, 92d, Cong,, 1st Seas, {1972), 
49Ibid, 
50lbid, 
5tPub, L, No, 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972) § ,03 (e)(3), 
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are not considered a functional scheme of water quality control 
financing. The "user charge" has become more popular in recent 
years due no doubt to its flexibility in raising sufficient revenues 
to meet increasing expeditures for pollution control at the state 
and local levels.52 It is now estimated that over 70 percent of 
municipalities with populations of 5000 or over utilize such a system. 53 
Moreover, as states enact legislation in order to comply with federal 
law~b~tb th~ extensiveness of its use and degree of reliance upon it~ 
are likely to increase substantially. This increase will no doubt 
result from the amount of additional revenue needed by state and local 
governments in remodeling existing water treatment facilities and in 
construction of new plants. Given these circumstances, the need arises 
f f 1 · d · f th · user f" · h or care u cons1 erat1on o e varying cnarge 1nanc1ng sc emes 
now employed in order that a functional derermination of their economic 
efficiency and effect.tve cost impact can be made. The following die-
cussion details the elements of various user charge financing schemes 
employed throughout the country. 
User charges are based on varying formulae. Some municipalities 
52Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, The Cost of 
Clean Water And Its Economic Impact (1969). The report is in three 
volumes. Volume I updates the Department of the Interior's 1968 cost 
analysis, Volume II, appendix, provides summary data from the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Administration's municipal waste inventories of 
1962 and 1968. Volume III, Sewerage Charges, discusses the financing 
of wastewater collection systems and the considerations pertinent to the 
selection of a user charge frogram by a local governmental unit as a 
means of raising revenue, LHereinafter referred to as Cost of Clean 
Water, J 
53volume III, 12-2J. 
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' 
charge a flat monthly rate with no user classification differential, 
Others employ a more complex formulae that might include not only a 
classification according to type of user (industrial--household) but 
also the number of plumbing fixtures and quantity of water purchased, 
The list below-5
4 
outlines the most widely employed methods of calcul-
ating user charges. 
1.) Flat rate method: This financing scheme is used by the 
_____ maj~1:i_ty of_ cities hav:ing a population of 5,000 or less; its advantage 
is simplicity and where industry is slight and water uses are generally 
uniform, as in small communities, it is greatly relied upon. User 
charges, however, show no functional correlation to pollution costs. 55 
2,) Modified flat rate: This is a version of the flat rate 
charge in which charges are adjusted according to the type of water 
user, Usually users are classified into residential, business, munici-
pal, and light and heavy industrial classes,56 
3,) Water use method: Here user charges are based on a per-
centage of the water bill, the volume of water used, or a combined 
formula that includes both a se,;er and water charge, This financing 
scheme is frequently the method applied by large municipalities with 
-7 industrial complexes,) 
5
4
The listing is taken from Morse, "The Cost of Purity: Use 
of the Effluent Char1'e in Weter Quality Control and Management," 
7 Valparaiso U. Law Ilev, 169 (1973), 
55yolunte III, at 21. 
56Jbi d., at 22-23, 
57Ibi<l., at 16-18. 
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' 
4.) Plumbing fixtures: Charges in tdis financing scheme are 
based on the amount and type of fixtures employed by users. It is 
not conmonly used, and Texas may now be the only state where this 
formula is applied.SS 
5.) Sewer connection and tap fees: Almost all municipalities 
have an initial minimal charge often labeled a connection or tap on 
charge. The method of calculating this charge varies with: (a) the 
-size -of-the-sewer- connection or water -meter,---fb}---the-locP.-tion-oi'-the 
customer, and (c) the condition of the street.59 
6.) Joint treatment and industrial surcharges: In recent years 
the joint treatment of municipal and industrial wastes has greatly 
expanded due to the growth of sanitary districts and industry's will-
ingness to join municipal waste treatment systems. Here surcharges may 
be hased on four differrmt calculations: a constant rate formula, a 
quality-quantity formula, the California formula, and the Joint 
Committee formula. 60 The constant rate formula is usually based on 
water use or type of business and is similar to the user charge method 
of calculating rates. This financing scheme is often used because of 
the simplicity in administration.
61 
The quality-quantity formula is increasingly being employed by 
municipalities throughout the country. Taking into account the amount 
58Ibid., at 19-20. 
59Ibid., at 24-25. 
60 Morse, supra at 182-83. 
61Ibid. 
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and characteristics of the sewerage, costs are attempted to be allocated 
among the actual polluters. 
The California formula employs both flat rate charges and 
quantity-quality charges and allows considerable geographical flexibility 
62 in charge plans. 
The Joint Committee formula is based on nonuser fees collected 
through property taxes or special assessments and user fees assessable 
-through_quali_ty_...qu,_anti,_ty_ formula. 63 
The above listed financing schemes are in many respects mean-
ingless in and of themselves. In the abstract they tell little of 
their effectiveness in solving either the "economic problem" of 
pollution or the equitable problem of distributing social costs. 
It is to the former question that this paper now turns. 
The '~conomic Problem of Pollution 
Pollution, as stated earlier, is essentially an economic 
problem . 1· ·1 t 64 1nvo v1ng socia cos s. As an economic problem pollution 
results from a market imperfection in the pricing system. Economists 
62Ibid. 
63volume III, at 32. 
64see Ostrom, "The Water Economy and Its Organization; in 
Politics, Policy, and Natural Resources )76-96 (D. Thompson ed •. 1972). 
-20-
have long noted this imperfection which they refer to as an "external 
economy." 65 
The Salton Sea in Southern California for inatance66 is one 
of the most productive inland fisheries in the country. Being fed 
by water that flows through the heavy fertilized Imperial Valley, 
its aquatic life is enhanced considerably as a result of the amounts 
of plant nutrients deposited therein. This situation represents an 
- - example- of--" ex-ternal -economy ·-"67 The fishers_in__the __ aea _reap_the __ _ 
benefits of fertilizer payed for by farmers in the valley. The 
economic problem is that the price system does not provide for 
payment to the farmers by the fisherman. 
While this may be a pleasant by-product of agriculture from 
the fisheries viewpoint, the situation leads to a misallocation of 
68 resources. Farmers, acting econsmically, apply fertilizer until 
the last 1 dollar worth of fertilizer produces 1 dollar worth of 
crops. Farmers do not take into account the effect of the fertilizer 
on the yield of the fisheries. Even though the next 1 dollar worth 
of fertilizer would :would increase the yield of the fisheries by say 
.05 cents and increase the farmer's crop yield by .98 cents and 
thereby contribute more to the national output than it costs, it 
would still not be applied by the farmer. Less of the resource is 
65see Dorfman, Robert, The Price System. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 
661bid. 
67Ibid. 
681bid. 
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employed than would be ideal from the point of view of national 
output. This situation seems to hold generally wherever exteral 
. . t 69 economies ezis. 
Oysters of the Chesapeake Bay and the clam beds of Long 
Island are, on the other hand, being endangered by polluted waters 
from the cities and industries of the East. 70 This situation is an 
example of an "enternal diseconomy." Unfortunately, external "disecon-
-omi-es"- seem-to-be-far- more prevalent than-"-economies.-"-Traffic-con-- --
gestion and air, noise, and water pollution are all instances of 
external "diseconomies." In all these cases, private economic actions 
have deleterious side effects for which the perpretrator is not 
charged but which nevertheless sometimes results in serious social 
costs. 
The defect is inherent in the price system where the guiding 
principle is that each enterprise should bear the cost of the re-
sources it employs, and no others, and should receive the benefits 
of the goods it produces, and no others. However, where sternal 
diseconomies exist the price system does not in some cases transmit 
the proper information or motivation for this principle to be able 
to operate. No charge is imposed by the price system on the firms 
and cities for their damages to the coastal waters, or the industries 
and activities dependent on pure water. 
691bid. 
?Olbid. 
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Moreover, efficiency of the price system in resource allocation 
depends on the identity of private and social costs. So long as.every 
producer compensates somebody for every cost imposed by his production, 
his profit-maximizing decisions about how much to produce, and how, are 
also socially efficient decisions of resource allocation. Private 
and social costs are identical in such an instance. The water poll-
uting producer, however, is charged for some of the natural resources 
. he .consumes, the capital he wears out, and thl!_labor_that he emplois __ 
but not for the cost of his polluting use of water. Since his poll-
uting use harms others, the social cost is not zero as ia the private 
cost of the producer's polluting use as an "unpaid for factor" 71 in 
production. The polluting use of water being cost free to the poll-
uter, the cost of the polluter's benefits derived therefrom are ex-
ternalized on to society. The producer's market price is left unaffected 
by the cost of the polluting use. 
The price system cannot take such effects into account. 72 With-
out prices to convey the needed information the polluting use as an 
"unpaid for factor" in production results in profit-maximizing allo-
cation of resources. What appears to be needed is a regulatory system 
whereby the resulting external cost of the polluting use is interna-
lized. If each polluting user ,rere made to bear the cost of his own 
pollution, private and social costs would cease to be divergent and 
the polluting user's decisions would in addition be socially efficient 
decisions. Moreover, polluters would seek out every available means 
71Ibid. 
72Ibid. 
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to reduce their polluting uae in order to reduce their own coat•, 
Thia can be accomplished by putting a price on "polluting use,• 
A price-based pollution control system would differ from the 
ordinary transaction system only in that a regulatory agency would set 
the prices, instead of their being set by demand-supply forces, and 
that the state would force payment. 73 Under this system anyone could 
emit pollution so long as the price set by the regulat0%7 authority, 
-which-vould be the- marginal aocial cost of -that-pol-lu-ting-use,--•-- - ----
paid. Private decisions in this instance, though baaed on self-
interest, would be socially efficient decisions. 
Since pollution is of many types and in varying degrees there 
would naturally be different prices for different kinds and levels 
of pollution. Extremely dangerous polluting uses would have an ex-
tremely high price, and in principle at least, the prices would vary 
vith geographical location, season of the year, and even day of the 
week, although too many variables might entail a prohibitive admin-
· t t' t 74 is ra 1ve cos. However, once these prices were set polluters could 
adjust to them any way they chose to. Acting out of self-interest they 
would reduce pollution by every means possible and since everyone 
would be charged the same price for the same type of pollution the 
marginal cost of abatement vould be the same everywhere. 75 
This self-regulating system necessitates the creation of a 
73ituff, supra at 78, 
74Ibid. at 79, 
75Ibid, 
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public administrative authority. Its job would be to measure the 
output of pollution from all sources, set the prices for pollution 
costs, and serve as a central coordinating authority for cost-stand-
ards and federal-state relations. 
In such a water pollution control and management system private 
and social costs are identical. Furthermore, the market would now 
be effectively self-regulating enabling socially efficient maximizati,n 
of resources. In this system, were the cost of the "polluting use" 
is internalized by the polluter, incentives are not destroyed but 
rather enhanced since the development of new pollution control 
methods will reduce the cost of pollution payments. It might also 
be easier to agree on a simple schedule of pollution prices than on 
a complex set of administrative regulations. This regulatory price-
system would also seem to insure a flexible and easily applicable 
means for financing water pollution control and management systems. 
Economies and User Charges 
In considering the variety of financing schemes employed 
throughout the United States it becomes apparent that most do not 
operate so as to functionally internalize pollution costs. User 
charges as outlined earlier generally tend to charge not according to 
the cost of polluting use but for use of water per se. Charges based 
on "'8tt!r use, flat rate, plumbing fixtures, and even modified flat 
rate formulae are not functionally calculated so as to internalized 
pollution costa, 
In the joint treatment financing scheme \<here regulations 
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normally control the types of waste that are acceptable in the treat-
ment system, non-acceptable waste must be given pretreatment. How-
ever, it appears that such regulations are not vigorously enforced?
6 
with the result that industrial users are not charged full costs. As. 
a consequence, some municipalities incur large costs vhich are passed 
on to local taxpayers and other users. 
In all the user charge schemes of financing only the quality-
- - -- quantity- formula-seeks--to internalize the cost-of--the -"polluting-use-"·-- ---
Since this formula takes into account both the amount and character-
istics of sewerage and allocates costs among the actual polluters, it 
serves as an inducement to pretreatment and to red•cia& the quantity 
of waste load. Criteria for determining the kind and degree of poll-
ution in this financing scheme, however, are often crude classifi-
cations founded on no more than perhaps the old reliable "logical 
guess." As one author states, "the method involves a total admin-
istrative scheme of testing, enforcement and calculation of treatment 
charges vhich impedes its implementation in areas with inadequate 
technical competence.?? Even in areas where such technical expertise 
is available it is usually either ignored or underutilized. 
Having suggested the internalization of costs in creating a 
self-regulating price system as the "economic solution• to water 
pollution this study now considers the non-economic question of 
76 Cost of Clean Water, Vol. I, supra at 10. 
77Morse, supra at 182. 
equity or fairness in distributing the social cost of pollution. 
Equity in Water Pollution Control Financing 
Theories of cost assessment vary in proportion to the degree 
of emphasis placed on diverging or similar goals. The theories of cost 
assessment summarized below78 represent the major theories of allocating 
costs in financing water pollution control and management systems in 
the various states. 
1.) Public utility theory: Sewage service is conc~ived as a 
cononercial P.nterprise ~uch as the production of electricity. Rates 
are computed on the metered amount of water the user consumes ..nd the 
most common method of assessment is a modified flat rate based on the 
classification of the user (residential, industrial, business, IIIUJlicipjll) 
and on the amount of use (not pollution).79 
2.) Diffused benefits theory: This theory assumes " "right 
to pollute" and states that benefits are derived by all individuals, 
inside and beyond the municipality, from the collection and treat-
ment of sanitary sewage and industrial waste. It takes all respon-
sibility away from the polluter and allocates costs among the federal, 
state and local levels of goveTlllllent by general tax levies. 80 
3.) Added expenditure theory: This theory holds that the 
78The Listing is taken from Morse, supra at 183-85, 
79cost of Clean Water, Vol. II, supra at JS. 
SOibid. 
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additional cost, once the primary function of the sewage system ia 
determined (whether it be s~orm sewage or sanitary and business 
the to user. sewage), should be cl.arged It operates 
81 
like the public utility theory mentioned above. 
functionally much 
4.) Alternative revenue theory: This procedure arrives at the 
same result again as the public utility theory; it states that user 
charges are more acceptable than increased property tall:es. The theory 
~·~ ._looks toward the availa!>ility of revenue and .the ability ~.iml'l!se the 
aost burden on the general public; it concludes that user charges are 
more economically efficient than traditional methods of taxation as 
well as being more acceptable to the public. 82 
5.) Capital and operation cost theory: This the•ry assigns 
capital costs to nonusers (property o'llllers who benefit from enhanced 
property values) and operating costs to users (those who discharge 
wastes into the system).83 
6.) Differential benefits theory: Here cost is di~ided in 
proportion to benefits derived from the service (not from the polluting 
use). The theory would take away any direct responsibility for poll-
ution control from the creator of the waste. It also involves numerous 
complex evaluations, such as assessing the coat of recreational benefits 
or the hypothetical loss incurred if there were no service.84 
81 Ibid at 39. 
82.torse, supra at 184. 
83Ibid. 
84 Cost of Clean Water, Vol. III, supra at 40-41. 
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I ~ 
,'.) r..., 1 3tive use .!.h!!!.iz~ The <1ystem is divided into parts 
such as the collection system and the treatment plant system. Costs 
are then allocated on the basis of the volume of sewage flowing 
through each part. Nonusers would then be responsible for collection 
costs (storm and infiltration water) and users would be responsible 
for treatment of sewage.85 
8.) Joint Committee theory: This theory was formulated by 
representatives _of_ eight national conmi ttees on wate;r _resourc_~e~~- ___ _ 
control. It divides cost between property owners and users based on 
annual fixed and operating costs. Fixed costs are divided into coll-
ection, interception, ~umping rtation and plant categories. The costs 
are then allocated to user, storm water, future growth and infiltration 
categories on the basis of volume and characteristics of severeg~. 
Property is allocated the cost for future growth, infiltration and 
storm water. The same accounting methods are used for calculating 
operating costs. The property share is payable through special assess-
86 
ments or property and the user share by user charges. 
There are important distinctions to be drawn in dealing with tlle 
economic question of pollution as opposed to the political question of 
equity or fairness in distributing social costs. A situation is said 
to be economically efficient if it is not possible to rearrange things 
so as to benefit one person without harming another. 87 Simply stated, 
85Ibid.at 41. 
86~ .at 41-45. 
87see, Dorfman, Ro\Jert and Dorfman, Nancy., eds. f<'.:?'':'mi2s of. 
the Environment, (New York, Norton,1972) for a number of <td:ini;ions of 
Pare to Optilliality. All created to suit the writer's p,i.~·ticalar pciut 
of view. 
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that is the economic equation for efficiency. But as Lawrence Ruff 
points out "Politically, this equation can be solved in various -ys: 
though most reasonable men will agree that efficiency is a good thing, 
they will rarely agree about which of the many possible efficient 
states, each with a different distribution of 'welfare' among indiv-
88 iduals, is the best one." 
Although economics itself has nothing to say about which 
efficient state is best from the standpoint of equity and fairness, 
this science can suggest ways of achieving efficient states that in 
themselves functionally 1t0rk to-rds resolving a specific "economic" 
problem. In the end, the issue of equity is a matter of personal and 
philosophical values destined to be resolved in the socio-political 
process. But economics can often quite accurately describe the equity 
considerations involved in any suggested policy attempting to resolve 
what is fundamentally an economic problem. Water pollution control 
financing is an economic problem. As noted earlier, it results from 
market imperfection in the price system. Concisely stated, the 
problem is that the "polluting use" of -ter is considered a "free-
good." And as the first principle of economics dictates, society must 
pick up the tab for the polluters• "free lunch." Polluters to some 
extent merely pass on their internal "private costs" to society as 
a vhole by externalizing them as "social costs." The economic solution 
lies in simply requiring that those who benefit by the polluting use 
bear the burden of the cost of their polluting use. 
This economic solution (internalization of costs) clearly 
88rtuff, supra at 73. 
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illustrates the equity considerations that are necessarily involved in 
determining cost allocation 'When financing vater pollution control 
systems, In fact, 'When considering this economic solution, it becomes 
apparent that p·~rhaps no more equitable method of cost allocation 
could be devised, What could be fairer than those 'Who benefit from 
the polluting use pay for cost of their polluting use? 
Many of the cost allocation theories earlier discussed already 
demolls~tl'll.~f! .in .s.ome~degree a preference for .Placing the burden of 
financing vaste water treatment on polluting users, Theories of cost 
assessment that seek to distinguish between users and non-users on the 
basis of classifications 'Which separate, for instance, storm and infil-
tration vater from user sewerage per se, are in this respect drawing 
reasonable distinctions in allocating costs, Often such theories of 
cost assessment (relative use; capital and operation, etc,) rightly 
finance operations on the basis of both property taxes and user 
charges, Sewer connection and tap fees also correctly attempt assess-
ment financing 'When functionally related to actual fixed as opposed 
to operating costs. All of these functional distinctions attempt in 
various ways, though some more successfully than others, to assess the 
cost of water treatment on the basis of benefits to polluting users. 
User charge financing schemes also fall, at least conceptually, 
into this particular cost allocating category. User charges, however, 
in most cases fail to functionally correlate the "cost of the polluting 
use" with the "amount of the charge" levied on the polluting user. 
The "flat rate" user charge scheme for instance exhibits little 
functional correlation since it is based solely on a percentage of the 
total amount of water used rather than on the actual clean up cost of 
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polluting use. It thus considers only one of the several factors 
that determine the cost of polluting use. Moreover. the sole factor 
of "water quantity" that it considers may often be of minor import-
ance in the actual polluting use cost calculation. 
The "modified flat rate" user charge scheme embodied in the 
"public utility" theory of cost assessment suffers to a leBBor extent 
from this same deficiency. Like the "flat rate" scheme it places 
direct responsibility on the users of water but goes further in cal-
culating rate charges by classifying users into general and thus dis-
functional categories. It fails because it bases its rate charges on 
broad classes of users instead of specific types of polluting uses. 
Along these same lines. cost assessment theories that place 
the burden of financing waste water treatment on either federal. state. 
or local general revenue appropriations are highly inequitable since 
no attempt is even made to correlate pollution costs and polluting 
uses. Both the "diffused benefits" and "differential benefits" 
theories of financing fall into this category. 
Needed is a financing scheme that embodies reasonable user 
non-user distinctions and in addition employs a user charge that 
functionally relates charge rates to actual cost of polluting use. 
Such a financing arrangement would seem to be the best of all possible 
worlds. It would be functionally satisfying from the standpoint of 
both economics nnd equity. 
Effluent Charge Financing 
The effluent charge financing concept has been discribed .. 
a levy on a party for using the environment by discharging 
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an effluent into it, and depriving someone else of 
the use he would like to make of the environment. 
While the concept is sometimes called an effluent 
tax, or an emission. tax, this nomenclature is not 
strictly correct. A tax is a general charge with 
no immediate quid pro quo for the payer; thus there 
is a talC on tobacco and on income. A charge by the 
post office or for grazing on government land is 
another thing, however. It is 3
9
fee for a service 
rendered or a damage sustained. 
Administration and implementation of such a aystem is far 
from a simple task. However, the major problem encountered is also 
- - its greatest benefi t--«Ietermining the cost of~poll.utiori and what it 
is worth at different stages of use and to ...tiom based on a theory of 
cost-benefit analysis. This problem though, for the most part, has 
been overcome by scientifically establishing complex pollution cost 
indices that are functionally correlated to waste discharges by 
polluters.90 Another difficulty arises in attempting to impose 
such a system upon a legal structure based on faulty assumptions as 
to the nature of water. Water use classification is often determined 
by the status of the user (ie. whether the rightholder is a "riparian" 
user or "appropriations" user), or by classification of the water 
itself (ie. whether the water is "ground water" or "surface water"), 
or on the basis of other artificial distinctions.91 Moreover, water 
pollution control laws do not always take account of the "rights" 
embodied in these legal classifications. Despite the nicities of legal 
89nite, supra at 109-10. 
90see Kneese and Bower, supra. 
9lMorse, supra at 170. 
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categories, nature insists on floving its own course, The result 
is often inconsistency in statutory construction and unavoidable 
conflict in environmental administration and enforcement, A func-
tional water quality control and management system must transcend 
convenient legal distinctions that are not in accord vith reality, 
It must include all water sources and water users, Application of 
effluent charge financing is not restricted vithin the confines of 
current legal terminology, It assumes no "right to pollute" and 
levies a charge on "all" polluting uses, 
The various economic, administrative, and procdural aspects 
of the effluent charge have been discussed at length elsewhere.
92 
For the purposes of this article it is sufficient to note that the 
system has had much success in Germany's Ruhr valley,93 This system 
known as the Genossenschaften consists of eight regional associations 
which operate a waste disposal system and water supply, It distributes 
the cost of water quality operations by levying charges on the effluents 
discharged in each region, Although a number of side calculations ate 
made, in principle, costs are distributed in proportion to aggre-
gate dilution requirements established by a central coordinating body, 9'* 
The system is based on the principle that costs should be borne both by 
members who are responsible for the effluent discharges and by those 
9'.?Kneese and Bower, supra at 1'*3-79, 
93see Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District, in 
Comparison in Resource Management 152 (H, Jarret ed, 1961), 
9\iorse, supra at 172, 
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who benefit f-,,om the use of the "W&t-'r. Th;, system also includes 
strict regulatory supervision by the state. Although the Ruhr river 
is the sewer for one of the world's most concentrated industrial areas 
(the Ruhr valley contains 40 percent of German industry, including 80 
percent of coal, iron, steel, and heavy chemical capacity)95 and the 
river itself is small, with a low flow of less than half the flow on 
the Potomac near Washington, 96 people fish and swim in the Ruhr river; 
yet, the volume of wastes is extremely large--actually exceeding the 
flow of the river itself in the dry season. 97 No doubt much cf tbis 
system's success is attributable to its comprehensive regional orient-
ation. It also employs both qualitJ and quantity control methods 
including collective waste treatment plants, use of certain streams for 
waste-effluent carriage, diversion of stream flow to promote purity and 
enhance waste sterilization, and use of artificial recharge of under-
ground aquifers. 98 
This system necessarily ignores straight marginal cost pricing 
in favor of a charge that provides an incentive to preserve scar~e 
resources.99 The effluent charge thus levied serves two purposes: 
(1) it acts as an equitable means of assessing the cost and distiibuting 
95auff, supra at 84. 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
98iJanks, Eleary and Kneese, Develo ent of a Water i)uclity 
Mana ement Pro ram for the Delaware River Basin 10 1963Tlreport to 
the Delaware River Basin Commission. 
99Morse, supra at 174. 
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the benefits of the regulation and treatment of stream 1n1ters, and 
(2) it provides an incentive to polluters to reduce waste loads through 
process adjustment, recovery practices and pretreatment since it inter-
nalizes cost. 
The American experience with the effluent charge concept has 
so far been extremely limited, though California,100 and more recently 
Vermont101 have used various aspects of the effluent charge concept in 
their respective water pollution control and management systems and the 
Delaware River Basin Compact102 on the Eastern Seaboard embodies this 
"regional" approach to comprehensive planning and control. 
In summary, it should be noted that the effluent charge concept 
provides both the "economic" solution to pollution and a cost assess-
ment equitably acceptable to most users. Furthel'l!lore, it is capable of 
producing revenue adequate to meet a water quality control and manage-
ment system's operational needs. The effluent charge accomplishes 
this by directly and functionally relating the cost of the user charge 
to the actual cost of polluting use. 
Various proposals have been put forth for the adoption of some 
fonn of effluent charge system in the United States.l03 With the 
passage of the Federal Wate~ Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,104 
lOOibid. at 174-77. 
lOlibid. 
l02Ibid. 
l03See Grady, "Effluent Charges and the Industrial Water Poll-
ution Problem", 5 New Eng. L. Rev. 61 (1969). 
104 ( Pub. L. No. 92-500 Oct. 18, 1972). 
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the op.,ortU11i iy read113 pre sen-.. its elf for the states to adopt 
the effluent charge as part of a total water control system corres-
ponding with the present system of sewer and municipal waste charges.l05 
Water treatment districts would be the conduits for monies that relate 
to costs of use and benefit to municipal facilities and residents. 106 
The state as a central coordinating and managing authority wo~ld act 
as the next level of collection and distribution with power to admin-
. t har dded 1 . f. ~ · t · 1 1 07 " _. ___ is er-sure ges, a . evies, 1nes, .. anu.-.1ncen 1ve_p ana~-1>1:ven __ _ 
sufficient technological competence, such a comprehensive system would 
be able to enforce mandatory regulations, determine the amount of 
effluents a particular user was adding to the water supply, and 
encourage and assist users in improving techniques for pretreatment 
and reduction of waste loads. 108 
The Kentucky Case 
The Kentucky legislature in 1972 in order to comply with 
Federal regulations concerning the operation of sewerage treatment 
facilities and in order to provide an agency to generate funds for this 
purpose, created the Kentucky Pollution Abatement Authority.l09 In 
105 See Morse, supra. 
l06Ibid, at 188, 
l07Ibid. 
lOSibid. 
l09K.U.S. ch. 221<A, 
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complying with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972 this state agency was created in order that it might regulate 
the construction of sewerage treatment facilities, generate funds in 
order to procure matching federal grants, and enter into financing 
contracts with local water districts. The main features of the 
Authority are its talr:ing and regulatory powers. 
The Authority as created is a public corporation and a gov-
eI'Dlllental- agency -that -is to act as an instrumental-i-ty--of--the-s-ta-te- ----~-
110 of Kentucky. The affairs of the agency are managed by a board of 
five members, 'Who serve without compensation for four years, appointed 
by the governor of the state. 
These five appointees are the governing board of the Authority 
and are relatively autonomous though for administrative purposes the 
Authority is directed "to establish and maintain offices" in "the 
appropriate and responsible state department." The Authority is thus 
attached to the "state water pollution agency" 'Which is defined by law 
as the Kentucky Water Pollution Control Commission of the Department 
of Heal th. 111 
The Authority is given power to make state grants as fr.nds are 
available to any "governmental agency," and to assist the agency ih 
construction of waste water treatment works, 'Which will constitute and 
be eligible projects for state-federal assistance. 112 This section of 
llOK.R.S. ch. 224A.OJO. 
111Ibid. 224A.010. See, Senate Bill 112, 1974 G<eneral Assed,ly, 
effective June 21, 1974, discussed supra. 
112Ibid. 2241\.040. 
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the Act states that it is the purpose of the agency to "m&Iimize the 
total amounts of federal grant participation received for all eligible 
projects inatituted by governmental agenciea within the co1111110nvealth ·of 
Kentucky."113 
The power to levy tu:es is also conferred to the Authority. The 
Authority is declared to be an independent taxing district 1ilhose 
district encompasses the entire geographical area of the conmonvealth 
of Kentucky. Such broad authority is based on the fact that its object-
ives serve "a statewide purpose not related to any specific area or 
locality of the state ••• but affecting the welfare and health of all 
Kentucky citizens ••• both functionally and economically.
114 
The 
Authority, upon resolution of its governing body, may levy and collect 
a tu: upon every purchase of water service in the co1111110nweal th of Ken-
tucky, "such tax to be equal to not more than two percent (2:,;) of the 
gross amount of each purchase of water service."115 Tax receipts 
constitute Authority revenues and can be used to carry out the purpose• 
for 'Which the Authority is created (matching state funds) but also 
can be used for the purpose of payment of principal and interest on 
Authority revenue bonds. 
Thus, by way of this 2:,; tax on water service, the legislature 
intended to give the Authority power to raise matching State funds in 
order to participate in the Federal grant-in-aid program. But there 
113Ibi d. 
114Ibid •. 22~.Q6o. 
H 5Ib i ..!!.:_ 
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are other avenues open for generating state fund• available to the 
Authority. Namely the issuance of revenue bonds by the Authority, 116 
the issuance of general state obligation bonds to generate revenue 
for the Authority subject to voter approval, 117 direct appropriations 
from the state legislature, and the transmittal of sewer charges to 
the Authority from local governml!ltal agencies operating sewerage 
treatment facilities as agreed on in "assistance agreements" between 
the Authority and local governmental agencies in connection with 
"eligible projects." 
The Authority, it can be seen, has access to the following 
sources of revenue: appropriations from the state legislature to the 
Authority; 118 issuance of Authority revenue bonds; 119 issuance of 
general state obligation bonds; 120remittal of sewerage charges from 
local governmental agencies in eligible projects as stipulated in 
"assistance agreements" between the Authority and local governmental 
agencies operating eligible projects; 121 power to levy statewide 2% 
_.__ t . 122 
t,GA. on wa er service. Thus the Authority has the option of 
issuing revenue bonds or levying the 2% statewide water service tax 
116Ibid. 22u.120. 
117Ibid. 22u.220. 
118Ibid. 22u.050. 
119Ibid. 224A.120. 
120ibid. 224A.220. 
121Ibid. 22u.190. 
122Ibid, 224A.060. 
. 
to raise revenue to natch federal funds. After this money is raised 
on the state level by the Authority and federal grants are procured, 
the Authority may distribute this money to local governmental agencies 
involved in eligible sewerage treatment projects. These state grants 
to the local governml!ltal agencies are, though, only loans which must 
be repaid to the Authority123 as to the aggregate principal amount of 
the state grant plus interest on the aggregate balance of the principal 
_8.lllount_fro_m !ime to t~me remaining unpaid, computed at the applicable 
interest rate, plus 1/4 of 1%. 124 In order to pay back these state 
grants, local governmental agencies are empowered to enter into "assist-
ance agreements" with the state authority and to covenant with the 
Authority to impose service charges upon all persons to whom sewer 
services are provided by the construction of eligible projects. 125 
These charges may be "in addition to all other rates and rentals, 
and charges of a similar nature now or hereafter authorized by law and 
now or hereafter being levied and collected by such governmental 
agencies." Thus the local governmental agencies may impose service 
charges to repay state grants. Indeed the State Pollution Abatement 
Authority can require the imposition of sewerage charges through 
126 stipulation of these charges in "assistance agreements." The 
Authority is specifically authorized in the event any governmental 
1231hid. 221.a.10o(s)(a)(b) • 
125Ibid. 224A,080(5)(7). 
126Ibid. 224A.070 (7); 224A.100(10). 
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agency 'llhich is a party to an assistance agreement fails to perform 
its duties in the assistance agreement, to directly impose sewerage 
charges in the Authority's name. 127 Both the local governmental 
agencies and the state authority have the power to compel local 
water users that could reasonably be served by the eligible project 
. 128 · to join the proJect. The Authority also has the power to compel the 
local governmental agencies to adjust their service charges to meet 
the requirements of an assistance agreement. 129 Finally, assistance 
agreements .. may provide. by their terms. that service .. chargee .levied by 
local governmental agenciee for payment to the Authority be reduced, 
diminiehed, or extinguished to the extent that the Authority has, 
during any fiscal period of the Authority, levied and collected 
water utility taxes pureuant to its power to tax as an independent 
statewide taxing district. 130 Such reduction, diminution or extinguish-
ment of local service charges to be based upon formulas, procedures and 
other rules and regulations 'llhich shall be prescribed by the Authority. 
This then is the basic legal and administrative structural 
setting of the state machinery created by Kentucky law to comply with 
Federal regulations in this area. As discussed earlier, the Kentucky 
Pollution Abatement Authority has several alternative and possible 
resources of revenue in order to generate funds to enable it to enter 
assistance agreements with local government agencies for eligible 
127Ibid. 224A.1BO. 
128Ibid. 224A.1B0(2). 
129Ibid. 224A.190. 
iJOlbid. 224A.200. 
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projects. What must be kept in mh,d is that stE.te grants raised 
from these revenue.-sources and distributed to local governmcnul 
agencies must be repaid in full with interest. 
Now, and this needs to be underlined, if the costs of sewerage 
treatment grants are to be related economically and functionally to 
pollution sources the source of the state Authority's revenue for 
grants must be conaidered. If the revenue comes largely from legislative 
appro11rie.~ions the equities of cost diatribut_io11 depend obviously on 
the existing general tax policy in Kentucky. The raising of revenue 
via general obligation bonds seems politically infeasible in light of 
the fact that the issuance of the&e bonds would require voter approval 
and this provision was probably included as only an emergency source 
of funds. The issuance of Authority revenue bonds shifts the cost 
distribution to the local memebers of the eligible sewerage treatment 
projects to the extent that revenue from legislative appropriations 
are not used to pay interest and principal and are not calculated to 
be repaid by the local governmental agencies in the assistance agree-
ments. Thus, if Authority revenue bonds are used as the primary source 
of revenue the equity of cost distribution would depend upon the equitiea 
inherent in the local governmental agencies revenue raising scheae, which 
this paper will look at shortly. However, if the Authority uses its 
power as an independent taxing district and levies a 2% straightline 
water service tax statewide, the cost distribution would be grossly 
unequitable. Although the Act creating the Kentucky Pollution Abate-
ment Authority states that the Auth1rrity has this broad po.rer since 
the purpose of the tax is a statewide purpose and benefits 00 particlllur 
geographical area, the actual result would be just the opposite. Tl::at 
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ia, there is not only an inherent inequity in taxing all polluters 
alike (2~ tax statewide), but since local governmental water treat-
ment diatrict revenue schemes vary greatly, there is a likelihood 
that the costs of operating treatment facilities would not be uniform 
a1 between members of different sewerage treatment districts in 
eligible projects; not to mention people in water treatment districts 
not engaged in eligible projects. Moreover, since a good percentage 
of operating revenue for treatment facilities comes directly out of 
the local government's general revenue fund, equities in paying back 
state graBts to the Authority will vary to the extent that tax policies 
of local governmental units vary. 
The Act creating the financing scheme of the Kentucky Pollution 
Abatement Authority did not provide for redressing inequities produced 
between citizens in eligible projects and those in non-participating 
projects (those not receiving state grants through assistance agreements). 
On the contrary, it provided that service charges levied by local govern-
mental agencies for payment to the state authority "may be reduced, 
diminished, or extinguished" to the extent that the Authority has levied 
its 2% statewide tax. Exact computation of the amount of the reduction 
would probably depend on the amount of revenue raised by this 2% tax 
from the particular district: such reduction being computed through 
adoption hy the state authority of rules, formulas, and regulations 
for this purpose. In light of the varying revenue raising schemes 
employed by local water treatment districts and considering the varia-
tion in the overall taxing policy of local governmental uni ts vhoae 
general nvenucs support such districts it is almost impossible to 
conceive of a formula or rule that would eliminate the resulting 
inequities inherent in the Authority's present financing scheme. How-
ever, both inequities in cost distribution and the failure to interna-
lize costs can be eliminated by the use of the effluent charge at either 
the state or local levels. 
A Statewide Effluent Charge 
A statewide effluent charge would replace the 2~ tax levy on 
water service statewide. It would maintain a statewide uniform scale 
for raising revenue (charging according to type of use and cost of 
treatment) while at the same time make the tax relate to the function-
al and economic realities of the purpose of this statewide charge, 
thus reducing the inequity of a non-functional straightline 2~ tax. 
This all could be done by a simple amendment. 
A Local Effluent Charge 
The State Pollution Abatement Authority bas the power to 
stipulate sewer service charges imposed by local governmental agencies 
in its assistance agreements with local agencies for eligible projects. 
Thus, the same uniform and functional scale for raising rev~nue and 
distributing costs as would be imposed at the state level by the 
Authority would also be.imposed in the eligible project districts by 
the local gover1::nental agencies. Thus an equitable determination of 
the amount that local Yervice charges would be reduced when the state-
-45-
wide charge is levied would be facilitated as would the equitable 
coat distribution between eligible project members themselves, 
Moreover, this local effluent charge could be implemented now under 
existing law, Furthermore, the Authority's 2~ statO¥ide tax certainly 
does not attempt to functionally internalize the cost of pollution, 
Water pollution control and management systems that may have 
been adequate in the past will cetainly not solve today's,imch less 
tomorrow's, problems, The only real solution to the water pollution 
--- -- - ------ -- ---------- ----
problem lies in a functional program of total water control rather 
than simply piecemeal attacks, The effluent charge concept resolves 
the economic problem of pollution and fairly distributes the social 
cost of pollution, State water pollution control administrative 
structures are now in their infancy, It is hoped that state imple-
mentation of this country's water resource goals will not abort the 
positive action that has already been taken, 
C. STATE AND INTERSTATE 
PARTICIPATION IN NPDES 
It has been stated and illustrated that Kentucky has the 
ability under existing legislative authority to undertake the 
regulatory actions necessary to implement an effluent tax on a 
statewide basis. However the larger issue in this study is 
whether an effluent tax can be levied by Kentucky as a part of an 
- -------- ----
interstate compact in its role as a member of ORSANCO affect1ng tlie 
Ohio River Basin. First to restate what has been set forth in the 
Study Reports to 0,W.R.R. upon which this report is based, Kentucky 
is a member of an interstate compact affecting the Ohio River Basin, 
and a statewide authority exists for the implementation of this and 
other compacts. The mechanism is, therefore, available.
131 
What should be emphasized is that the 1972 FWPCA AMENDMENTS 
require the states to implement both a charge on industrial users 
of sewerage facilities financed under federal funds and to initiate 
a state permit system as a part of the National Pollution Discharge 
El .. t' S t (NPDES),
132 
1m1na 1on ys em Failure to act in the former instance 
will cause loss of federal funds and in the latter, federal regulation. 
The states may consider themselves better able to create and operate 
a pollution permit system or, if not more able, at least more cognizant 
of the needs of their citizens. In any case, the federal water pollution 
131 K,R.S, 224.190; K,R.S. 224.195; K.R.S. 224.205, 
132.Fl,'PCA 1972 Amendments 204(b) and 402(b)(9) (P.L. 92-500, 
Oct. 18, 1972,) 
control acts have consistently taken the position that state action 
is primary, and the incorporation of the Federal Refuse Act of 1899 
into the Water Pollution Control Act has maintained state primacy 
in the area of pollution permits. 133 
Read together, the 1972 amendments require both user charges 
and a pollution permit system. It would appear that user charges can 
be incorporated into a pollution permit system to serve as both a 
_ ~I"C_!lll:t]:! __ Oil_ the_ polluter and as an incentive to achieve a state of 
non-discharge. It should be emphasized at this point that NPDES 
avoids the stigma of being a "tax to pollute" by creating time limits 
on permits as well as by being part of a larger, no-discharge water 
pollution control act. Permits are issued only after a determination of 
minimal or base effluent discharge limitations and as a part of a 
continuing program to eliminate effluent discharges. 134 The pollution 
l33FWPCA Sec. 101(b) "It is the policy of Congress to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States 
to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and 
use (including restoration, preservation, and enforcement) of land and 
water resources and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of 
his authority under this Act." Sec. 402{a){5) 11 ••• The Administrator shall 
authorize a State, which he determines has the capability of administering 
a permit program which will carry out the objective of this Act, to issue 
permits for discharges into the navigable waters within the jurisdiction 
of such State." 
l34Ibid., {b) "The Administrator shall approve each such submitted 
program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist: (1) 
To issue permits which--{a) apply, and insure compliance with, any 
applicable requirements of sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403; (b) are 
for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and {c) can be terminated or 
modified for cause, including but not limited to the following: {i) vio-
lation of any condition of the permit; (ii) obtaining a permit by mis-
representation, or failure to disclose fully all rele1VaDt facts; (iii) 
change in any condition that requires either a eemporary or permanent 
reduction or elimination of this permitted discharge; ••• " 
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tax envisaged is one that would create an incentive for the polluter 
to achieve a least-cost solution to the pollution problem, whether it 
would be installation of pollution control equipment, joining an area-
wide or regional control system, or shutting down cper•tiona altogether. 135 
The tax is expected to work as an incentive to achieve the most econ-
mic solution. Whether or not a regulatory agency such as the water 
control authority should use the tax systec in order to achieve zero-
pollution is beyond the scope of this study. It is necessary to point 
out that using the tax system for other than revenue purposes creates 
problems of oversight and misuse of the tax dollar. Moreover allowing 
the pollution control agency to act as the collector and user of such 
taxes would encourage a high tax rate not designed to achieve least cost 
methods of pollution control. 
The pollution tax or user charge is a second best answer designed 
to answer the problems of too little information available to set proper 
regulatory standards on effluent limitations. In a permit system, the 
l35see, Surrey, Stanle~ S., Pathways to Tax Reform. (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard U. Press, 1973} vho created the concept of tax expenditures 
as a means of describing "governmental financial assistance given 
through the tax system rather than through the direct methods of the 
regular budget, ••• " (p.vii). "As an example of 'What is meant by 
'least-cost abatement,' suppose two polluters, A and B, each emit 
100 pounds of pollutants. It costs A 50 cents to eliminate one pound 
of pollution, but costs B $1 a pound. If each eliminates 50 pounds 
of pollutants, then total pollution is reduced by 100 pounds. The 
total cost of abatement is $75• Clearly a cheaper way to eliminate 
100 pounds of pollutants wpuld be to have A stop polluting entirely, 
'While B does not abate al all. Then 100 pounds of total abatement 
costs only $50." ••• "Pollutbn uxes lead to~east-cost abatement in th~ 
following manner: Assume the pollution ta'.: is set at 50 cents a pow,d. 
If a polluter can eliminate a pound of pollutants from his emissions 
for less tb:ln 50cents, he will save money by doing so rather than paying 
the tax. Therefore a polluter will eliminate as many pounds of pollu-
tants from his emissions as he can, so long as the cost of abatement 
is less than 50 cents a pound." )p.156-7) 
tax create• an incentive to achieve leaat-coat effective methods 
of pollution control, This ans-wer assumes that the most efficient 
point discharge limitations are not known, or that technological 
ability to control pollution is not available, and that society is 
136 UDYilling to give up the products created by the polluter, 
Both the permit system and the effluent tax can be part of a 
larger aystem operating on a state or an interstate basis, The 1972 
FWPCA amendments require a user charge and state participation in the 
- - ------- --- --------- -- - - ---- --- ----- - -- - - - --
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, and the Water Pollution 
Control Act provides explicity for interstate agreements in the water 
136Ibid,, at 156-7, "If the desired solution to the pollution 
problem is to eliminate all emissions of pollutants, then a least-coat 
abatement--and a pollution tax--approach is not the appropriate path, 
Clearly, regulation of a prohibitory character is the necessary tech-
niques,,,,many economists consider such an approach [elimination by 
1985 of the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters under the 
1972 FWPCA] likely in the end to prove unfeasible except in rather 
special situations, They believe the costs of total elimination may 
be out of proportion to the benefits attained, and hence larger than 
the nation will desire to pay," Surrey discusses the problems involved 
in using the tax system for any reason other than revenue purposes, 
A particular disadvantage is the burden using tax policy for regulatory 
purposes places upon legislative committees unfamiliar with the problems 
involved therein, e.g. Tax Committees as opposed to Public Works or 
Commerce Committees, Administration of the tax is another problem, 
Should E,P,A. maintain primary authority? Moreover, if the charge were 
viewed as a regulatory tax, then1would be deductible, whereas a regulatory 
fine is not deductible in computing net income. Therefore the user 
charge can operate like a subsidy in that it benefits the rich more than 
the poor. The pollution tax or user charge must be viewed as a part of 
a multi-faceted approach, Any form of pollution control expenditure 
by an industrial user will have tax consequences, and the important 
point is that policy makers should be aware of this fact.when setting 
levels of charges or determining the advisalility of subsidy versus user 
charge, The choice between regulation versus user charges involves a 
different problem, that of technological feasibility and desired level 
of pollution control, and, in fact, a pollution control system should 
both include regulation and user charges, See, also, McDaniel, Paul R. 
and Kaplinsky, Allan S,, "The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to 
Combat Air and \later Pollution: A Case in Tax Expenditures," 12 Boston 
College Indllstrial and Commercial Law Review 351 (1970-1971). 
-50-
quality control area. 137 
ORSANCO is the interstate compact authority for the Ohio River 
Basin, and Kentucky is one of the members of this interstate compact. 138 
In the past, ORSANCO has operated on a low level of enforcement with a 
high level of technological cooperation and co11111UDity visibility. 139 
The interstate compact may eventually give way to area-wide and basin 
solutions insofar as natural resources are concerned; however, interstate 
mechanisms do exist and contain a politically acceptable and constitu-
tional means of dealing with political problems that involve interstate 
1 t . 1i.o re a 1.ons. 
lJ?P.L. 92-500, FWPCA 1972 Amendments provide in Sec. 10J(a) 
"The administra•or shall encourage cooperative activities by States 
for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, encourage 
the enactment of improved and, so far as practicable, uniform State 
laws relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution; 
and encourage compacts between States for the prevention and control 
of pollution. (b) The consent of the Congress is hereby given to two 
or more States to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts, not 
in conflict wi:th any law or treaty of the United States, for (1) coop-
erative effort and mutual assistance for the prevention and control 
of pollution and the enforcement of their respective laws ·relating 
thereto, and (2) the establishment of such agencies, joint orcther-
wise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements 
and compacts. No such agreement or compact shall be binding or obliga-
tory upon any state a party thereto unless and until it has been approved 
by the Congress. See, . the Interstate 
Imvironment Compact, S. Bill 907, 92nd Congress. 2nd Session, Jan. 2i., 
1972, a bill providing for Congressional preconsent to supplemental 
agreements by states. This report takes the position 
that Congressional oversight and approval of ~atters of national concern 
is necessary. The use of federal-interstate compacts and of unif•rm 
state lawn is a more acceptable solution -where the need for uniformity 
and the utilization of scarce resources are at issue. 
1-3 
) Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact [c.581, Stat. 752 (19i.o) 
and K.R.S. 224.190] 
lJ9Cleary, Edward J., The ORSANCO Story: Water Quality Manage-
ment in the Ohio Valley Under An Interstate Compact. (Baltimore, Md.: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). 
140Barton, Weldon V., Interstate Compacts in the Political 
Process, (Chapel Hill, N.C., U. of North Carolina Press, 1967); Grad, 
Frank P., "Federal St.ate Compact--A New Experim~nt in Cooperative Feder-al ism." 
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ORSANCO consists of three co11111issioners from each member state 
and three coamissoners representing the federal government •. The sign-
atories have agreed to cooperate in the abatement of existing pollution 
and in the control of future pollution in the Ohio River Basin and, "to 
enact any necessary legislation to enable each ••• state to place and main-
tain the waters of said basin in a satisfactory sanitary condition, 
available for safe and satisfactory use as public and industrial water 
_____________ supplies after reasonable treatment, stttable for recreational usage, 
Capable of maintaining fish and other aquatic life, free from unsightly 
or malordorus nuisances die to floating solids or sludge deposits, and 
adaptable to such other uses as :nay be legitimate • .,l4l The real problem 
of ORSANCO has been its lack of enforcement capacity in that member 
tat t t f t t . "th" th . b d 142 s es mus agree o en orcemen ac ions wi in eir own or ers. 
This problem has been made less serious, however, by recent court decisions 
on the federal common law applicable to actions involving the pollution 
of interstate waters. Moreover the federal governnmet would have enforce-
ment powers under the NPDES 'Whether or not the states cooperated in an 
interstate permit system under the umbrella of ORSANCo. 143 
63 Colum. L. Rev. 825 (1963). 
141ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Article I. 
142Ibid., Article IX. 
1'*3In Illinois vs. City of Milwaukee, 402 U.S. 91 (1972) the 
Supreme Court held that plaintiff state had a cause of action under 
federal common law to enjoin the pollution of interstate ~aters by 
governmeutal parties. A federal district court in United States vs. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 356 ~'. Supp. 556 (N.D. Il.l.. 1973) extended this rale 
to cases 'Where the defendant was a non-governmental body and the plaint-
iff was the United States. The 1972 FWPCA provides for federal enforce-
ment of state permits programs in Sec. 309. 
-52-
This report suggests that ORSANCO can be used, within the 
authority provided by Atticle I thereof, to implement an interstate 
permit system containing an effluent or user charge to be placed on 
all polluters. All of the states in ORSANCO now have a pollution 
control program that includes,·.·to some degree, a permit program. They 
vary from highly developed statutory programs in Illinois and New York 
to regulations implemented under the general authority of a water 
pollution statute such as in Kentucky. 144 
The Council of State Governments has developed a "Model Law 
to Enable States to Participate in the National Discharge Pollutant 
Elimination System Established Under the 1972 Federal Water Vollution 
Cnntrol Act. 11 It is suggested that Kentucky and those states in the 
Ohio River Basin that do not have comprehensive statutory provisions 
that llOUld allow entry into the NDPES should adopt this Hodel. The 
states in ORSANCO could then implement the NDPES on an interstate basis, 
insofar as certain elements of the program may allow for joint action. 145 
14,."To adopt, after hearing, such general rules and regulations 
pertaining to the prevention, abatement and control of existing or 
proposed pollution as the coll!lllisuion may deem necessary to the accom-
plishment of the purposes of K.R,S. 22i.,.010 to 224,060, 224.080 or 
22i.,,100." Kentucky Water Pollution Control Commission Regulation WP-1, 
Permits to Discharge Sewage, Industrial Wastes or Other·wastes, adipted 
January 8, 1957; Kentucky Public Hearings Regulations WP-2, adopted 
Hay 16, 1961;Kentucky Water Quality Standards Regulation WP-4-1, adopted 
August 22, 1971, were enacted under the authority of R.R.S. 224.0J.,O. 
Arnold, Thomas B., "Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State 
Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972," 15 Boston Coll. Industrial and Commercial L, R0 v. 767, 776, 
lists several states which have either enacted statutes or passed reg-
ulations implementing the NPDES program. 
ii.,5.,A Model Lav to Enable States to Participate in the National 
Discharge Pollutant Elimination System Established Under the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 11 
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Kentucky water pollution control law has utilized the regulatory 
process to implement the generalized prohibitions and requirements of 
K.R.S. 224 et. seq. Regulations WP-1, Permits to Discharge Sewage·; 
Industrial Wastes, or Other Wastes (Adopted January 8, 1957) is the 
existing permit regulations; it does not fulfill the industrial user 
requirement of &ection 402 of the 1972 FWCPA; however, revision of the 
regulation will be more efficient than legislative action, and it has 
__ _ _ _ _____ _______h_e_en stat.._4 tha_t the act requires only that a plan be submitted by the 
state and that the E.P.A. administrator assure that enforcement authority 
Hists in the state to implement the permit program. In fact, -the E.P.A. 
has approved state permit programs that were not yet fully realized in 
regulation or legislation.
146 
Kentucky has the legislative and regulatory framework to provide 
the necessary enforcement procedures, and, as discussed above, the leg-
islative framework for user charges has been created by the legislation 
and needs only to be implemented on a statewide basis.
147 
The major 
146 See, Arnold, Thomas B., +upra. at p. 775. The author takes 
the position that statutory implementation is a necessity; however, the 
E.P.A. regulations indicate that regulatory implementation is sufficient. 
Whether or not statutory implementation is a better way of preserving the 
political process is another question; however, the public hearing pro-
cedure provides public participation, and sullsequent legislatur,,s, as well 
as the judiciary have the ability to revise regulatory actions. ,.See, 
40 C.F.R. 124; 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, Dec. 22 1 1972, as amende,l 1,y 38 Fed. 
Reg. 17999, July 5, 1973, and 38 Fed. Reg. 19894, July 24, 1973.) 
147 See, Text, at notes 109-130, supra. 
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; 
problem has been and remains rationalizing the multitude of programs 
that now exist under different statutory authorities. 148 
The 1974 Kentucky legislature enacted Senate Bill 112, "An Act 
Relating to the reorganization of State Government." Article III of 
that Act, "Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection," 
revises K.R.S. Chapter 224 to a great extent and is the beginning of a 
needed restructuring of Kentucky natural resources administration. It 
- - - -- -- - --ts-as-yet-too-early-to-predic-t-the-ef-fect-of-the-New_Legisla:tioJl_OJl~--
the future of water quality control financing and a permit system; how-
ever, the reorganization goes a long way to create the needed framework 
for rationalization of the Kentucky framework. 
Section 1 of the Act amends K.R.·S. 11.060 to create program 
cabinet secre'8ries in the Office of the Governor who will constitute 
the governor's general cabinet. K.R.S. 12.020 is repealed, amended, and 
reenacted to create cabinet departments, which include, '.'3. Department 
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. (a) Environmental 
Quality Connnission. (b) Soil and Water Conservation Connnission. (c) 
Ohio River Sanitation Commission. 11149 
Section 2 of the Act creates a Bureau for Land Resources and a 
Bureau for Environmental Quality within the Department, each headed by 
148 See, Kentucky. Department of Natural Resources. Kentucky 
Framework 'i'Tater Plan, p. 29-40, for a listing of the various statutes 
and agencies dealing with water. 
149Baldwin's Kentucky Rev. Stat. and Rules Service • .!21i 
.;.::::c~~"-~I~ss~u~e~. Acts of 1974 Regular Session of the Kentucky General 
Cleveland, Ohio, Banks-Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 1974.) at 
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a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary of the Department for Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection. The Secretary is the successor 
office to the Conmissioner of Natural Resources. 150 
Section 10 established a new section of K.R.S. 224 that will 
transfer all corporate bodies, advisory connnittees, interstate compacts, 
or other statutory bodies now attached to the functions in whole or in 
part to the Department of Natural Resources or the Department of Envir-
__________ onmnetaLPro_tec:tion_to_the_S_e_cretacy_, __ wh_o _ _wi_l_l then assume all member-
ships and duties and the successor office, including that of Kentucky 
representative for the receipt of federal funds.
151 
Section 13 revises all prior sections of Kentucky Revised 
Statutes to coordinate the functions of predecessor offices under the 
new department. 
1. "Department of Natural Resources" to "Department 
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection", and 
specifically the Reviser of Statutes shall make such changes 
-when such language appears in KilS Chapters 146, 149 and 151. 
2. "Department of Environmental Protection" to "Depart-
ment for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection", 
and specifically the Reviser of Statutes shall nake such 
changes when such language appears in KilS Chapters 109, 
224,235 and 350. 
3. "Division" to "Department". "Director11 to "Secretary" 
and "Division of Forestry" to "Department for Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection" when such lang-
uage appears in KilS Chapter 149. 
4. "Division" to "Department" and "Director" to 
"Secretary for Natural Re!lllrces and Environmental 
Protectfon" -when such language appears in KRS Chapter 151 • 
150lbj d.' 
151Ibid,, 
at P• 51. 
at p. 52. 
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5, Delete subsection (3) of KRS 151,100 and renum-
ber all follcwinr subsection~. 
6, "Lepa1·tment of H~al th" to "Department for JJaturol 
Resot•"."ces and Environmental Protection" when such lang-
uage appears in IffiS 231,. 321. 
7, "Division" to "Department" and "Division of 
Reclamation" to "Department for Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection" 'When such language appears 
in KRS Chapter 350, 
8. "Department of Environmental Protection" to 
"Bureau for Heal th Services" in KRS 221,,223 to 
224.237 and "K.D.E.P." to "K •• B.H.S." in KRS 224.230, 
9~etlevfiior of~S'fatutes shall rnak<e any other 
statutory reference changes necessary to effect the 
intent of this Act, including the renumbering or re-
location of Sections 146,080, 146.090, 146.100 and 
11,6,110 in KRS Chapter 262. 
Section 14, Sections 146.010, 146,020, 146,025, 
11,6.050, 146.120, 151,130 and 224.031 of the 
Kentucky Revised Statutes are hereby repealed, 
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